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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the relationship between general relativity
and the theory of Einstein algebras. We show that according to a formal
criterion for theoretical equivalence recently proposed by Halvorson (2012,
2015) and Weatherall (2015a), the two are equivalent theories.
1 Introduction
For much of the Carter and Reagan administrations, John Earman argued that
Leibniz’s view on spacetime could be made precise by appealing to structures
that he called Leibniz algebras.1 On this proposal, rather than representing
spacetime as a manifold with some fields on it, one instead begins with an alge-
braic structure representing possible configurations of matter. One then shows
that, if this algebraic structure is suitably defined, one can use it to reconstruct
a manifold with appropriate fields. Thus, one has a sense in which spacetime
arises as a representation of underlying facts about (algebraic) relations between
states of matter, which is at least strongly suggestive of Leibniz’s remarks in
the correspondence with Clarke.2
Later, Earman argued that analogous algebraic structures—what Geroch
(1972) had previously called Einstein algebras—might provide the mathemat-
ical setting for an appropriately “relationist” approach to general relativity
(Earman, 1986, 1989b). The motivation for this proposal was the hole argument,
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under
Grant Nos. 1331126 (Rosenstock & Weatherall) and DGE 1148900 (Barrett). The authors
can be reached at rosensts@uci.edu, thomaswb@princeton.edu, and weatherj@uci.edu.
1See especially Earman (1977a), though he also discussed the proposal elsewhere (Earman,
1977b, 1979, 1986, 1989a,b).
2For the purposes of what follows, we remain agnostic about the historical question of
whether this is an adequate way of reconstructing Leibniz’s views. In particular, see Stein
(1977) for an importantly different perspective on Leibniz’s views. That said, history aside, we
do think this proposal is a plausible way of understanding what “relationism” could mean—
though Earman himself argued that the Leibniz algebra approach is a kind of “substantival-
ism”, albeit at a lower level.
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as redeployed by Stachel (1989) and Earman and Norton (1987).3 It seems Ear-
man hoped (indeed, argued) that a single Einstein algebra would correspond to
an equivalence class of relativistic spacetimes related by the isometries arising
in the hole argument. One might then take the Einstein algebra formalism to
do away with “excess structure” allegedly appearing in the formalism of rela-
tivistic spacetimes—that is, the formalism of manifolds and tensor fields—by
equivocating between what Earman and Norton described as “Leibniz equiv-
alent” spacetimes.4 This program ran aground, however, when Rynasiewicz
(1992) observed that one can define points in algebraic approaches to topologi-
cal spaces, and argued that this meant one could recover precisely the isometries
used in the hole argument as isomorphisms between Einstein algebras. Thus it
seemed Einstein algebras could not do the work Earman hoped.
We think Rynasiewicz had this essentially right. But there is more to say
about the relationship between Einstein algebras and relativistic spacetimes.5
There is a sense in which these are equivalent theories, according to a standard
of equivalence recently discussed by Halvorson (2012, 2015) and Weatherall
(2015a).6 More precisely we will show that, on natural definitions of the ap-
propriate categories, the category of Einstein algebras is dual to the category
of relativistic spacetimes, where the functors realizing the equivalence preserve
the empirical structure of the theories.
Our interest in this problem extends beyond dead horse flagellation, for two
reasons. One is that there has been a flurry of recent work on what it means to
say that two theories are equivalent.7 Here we provide a novel example of two
theories that are equivalent by one, but not all, of the standards of equivalence on
the table.8 That said, we do not intend to argue that this sense of equivalence is
the only one that matters, or even the best one; it is, however, a clear and precise
criterion of equivalence between theories, and it seems valuable to explore how
it rules on examples of interest as a way of better understanding its significance.
The present example is a datum for this ongoing debate.
Indeed, in this regard the example is of particular interest. On reason is
that it differs from other examples that have been explored by, for instance,
3For more on the hole argument, see Pooley (2013) and Norton (2011) and references
therein. One sees versions of both the hole argument and the Einstein algebra proposal in
Earman (1986).
4For an independent argument that it is misleading to think of the standard formalism of
relativity theory as having excess structure, see Weatherall (2015c) and Weatherall (2015d).
5Bain (2003) also takes this topic back up, though with somewhat different concerns.
6See Barrett and Halvorson (2015) for a discussion of the relationship between this sense
of equivalence and others; for a discussion of related notions, see Andre´ka et al. (2002, §6.4).
For an overview of work on this notion of equivalence, see Weatherall (2015b).
7For instance, in addition to the papers already cited, see North (2009), Curiel (2013),
Swanson and Halvorson (2012), Barrett (2014), Coffey (2014), Halvorson (2013), Glymour
(2013), van Fraassen (2014), Andre´ka et al. (2005), Barrett and Halvorson (2014), and
Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015a,b); of course, there are also some classics on the topic,
such as Glymour (1970, 1977, 1980), Quine (1975), and Sklar (1982).
8For instance, it is hard to see how these theories could be equivalent by Glymour’s criterion
of equivalence, since it is not clear how to make sense of “covariant definability” when one of
the theories is not formulated in terms of fields on a manifold.
Weatherall (2015a) and Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015a), in that the cate-
gories in question are dual, rather than equivalent. Another is that the appar-
ent differences between the theories in question—one appears to offer a direct
characterization of spatiotemporal geometry; the other uses primarily algebraic
methods to described relationships between possible states of matter, from which
geometry is reconstructed—are of a different character from other examples in
the literature, which may be of probative value as we try to evaluate the mer-
its of the criterion of equivalence. On this last note, it is striking that the
sense of equivalence we discuss here is lurking in the background of the argu-
ment Rynasiewicz (1992) made decades ago, in a different setting, long before
any discussion of using methods from category theory to explore equivalence of
(scientific) theories;9 as debates concerning theoretical equivalence continue, it
seems important that categorical equivalence has already played an important,
even dispositive, role in the philosophy of physics literature.
The second reason the point is worth making is that, as Earman has sug-
gested, the Leibniz/Einstein algebraic formalism does seem to capture a rela-
tionist intuition about how spacetime structure relates to possible configurations
of matter.10 In the background of such arguments is the idea that the standard
formalism of relativistic spacetimes is somehow “substantivalist”. The results
presented here might then be taken as a way of making precise the idea that a
suitably “relationist” theory, once one spells it out in sufficient detail, is equiv-
alent to the “substantivalist” theory, properly construed.11 In particular, the
sense of equivalence we consider here is often taken as a standard for deter-
mining when two mathematical theories have the same structure.12 And so,
the equivalence we discuss suggests that a relationist theory of general relativ-
ity, expressed in these terms, has precisely as much structure as the standard
theory.
9That is, the relationship between topological spaces and rings of functions that Ry-
nasiewicz relies on in his paper is precisely a well-known categorical duality, so in a sense,
we are following through on a promissory note that the same relationship carries over to
relativistic spacetimes and Einstein algebras.
10To be fair, it would not be right to say that Earman simply identified the Leibniz/Einstein
algebra formalism with relationism. For instance, although he suggests that Leibniz algebras
are a “natural candidate” for models of spacetime answering to Leibniz’s desiderata (Earman,
1979, p. 269), he ultimately concludes that they are not fully “relationist”: as he later puts
it, Leibniz/Einstein algebras are “first-degree non-substantivalist”, yet substantivalist on a
deeper level (Earman, 1986). But it is not our purpose to argue about what really constitutes
“relationism”. We take Earman to be suggesting—and we agree—that the Leibniz/Einstein
algebra approach offers a clear and compelling way of capturing the idea that spatio-temporal
structure may be reconstructed from relations between possible states of matter. (Indeed, we
do not know of any better way of making this idea precise.) If this is not relationism, but
rather some (putative) third way, so be it; as far as we are concerned, that does not affect the
interest of the results. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pushing us on this point.
11None of this should be taken to endorse the idea that the standard formalism some-
how pushes one to “substantivalism”. To the contrary, Weatherall (2015c), following Stachel
(1993), argues that to recover some of the claims Earman and Norton (1987) attribute to the
“(manifold) substantivalist,” one needs to add structure to the standard formalism—effectively
by choosing a global labeling system for spacetime points.
12See Baez et al. (2004) and Barrett (2013).
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The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. We will begin with
some background and mathematical preliminaries concerning general relativity
and the notion of equivalence we will consider in what follows. We will then
review the theory of smooth algebras and describe their relationship to smooth
manifolds. Finally, we will define Einstein algebras and prove our main result.
We will conclude with some further remarks on the significance of the result.
2 General relativity and categorical duality
In general relativity, we represent possible universes using relativistic spacetimes,
which are Lorentzian manifolds (M, g), where M is a smooth four dimensional
manifold, and g is a smooth Lorentzian metric.13 An isometry between space-
times (M, g) and (M, g′) is a smooth map ϕ : M → M ′ such that ϕ∗(g′) = g,
where ϕ∗ is the pullback along ϕ.14 Two spacetimes (M, g), (M ′, g′) are iso-
morphic, for present purposes, if there is an invertible isometry between them,
i.e., if there exists a diffeomorphism ϕ : M → M ′ that is also an isometry. We
then say the spacetimes are isometric.
The use of category theoretic tools to examine relationships between theories
is motivated by a simple observation: The class of models of a physical theory
often has the structure of a category.15 In what follows, we will represent general
relativity with the categoryGR, whose objects are relativistic spacetimes (M, g)
and whose arrows are isometries between spacetimes.
According to the criterion for theoretical equivalence that we will consider,
two theories are equivalent if their categories of models are “isomorphic” in an
appropriate sense. In order to describe this sense, we need some basic notions
from category theory.16 Two (covariant) functors F : C → D and G : C → D
are naturally isomorphic if there is a family ηc : Fc → Gc of isomorphisms of
D indexed by the objects c of C that satisfies ηc′ ◦ Ff = Gf ◦ ηc for every
arrow f : c → c′ in C. The family of maps η is called a natural isomorphism
and denoted η : F ⇒ G. The existence of a natural isomorphism between two
functors captures a sense in which the functors are themselves “isomorphic” to
one another as maps between categories. Categories C and D are dual if there
are contravariant functors F : C→ D and G : D → C such that GF is naturally
isomorphic to the identity functor 1C and FG is naturally isomorphic to the
identity functor 1D. Roughly speaking, F and G give a duality, or contravariant
equivalence, between two categories if they are contravariant isomorphisms in
13Here and throughout we assume that smooth manifolds are Hausdorff and paracompact.
For more details on relativistic spacetimes, see Malament (2012) and Wald (1984). One often
requires M to be connected; here we do not make that assumption. Alternatively, one could
require M to be connected, and limit attention below to Einstein algebras whose dual space
of points is connected, in the weak topology defined in section 3.1.
14Note that we do not require isometries to be diffeomorphisms, so these are not necessarily
isomorphisms, i.e., they may not be invertible.
15See footnote 6 above for references on this claim.
16We take for granted the definitions of a category, a covariant functor, and a contravariant
functor. The reader is encouraged to consult Mac Lane (1971), Borceux (1994), or Leinster
(2014) for details.
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the category of categories up to isomorphism in the category of functors. One
can think of dual categories as “mirror images” of one another, in the sense
that the two categories differ only in that the directions of their arrows are
systematically reversed.
For the purposes of capturing the relationship between general relativity
and the theory of Einstein algebras, we will appeal to the following standard of
equivalence.
Criterion. Theories T1 and T2 are equivalent if the category of models of T1 is
dual to the category of models of T2.
This criterion is almost exactly the same as the one proposed by Halvorson
(2012, 2015) and Weatherall (2015a). The only difference is that they require
the categories of models in question be equivalent, rather than dual. Equivalence
differs from duality only in that the two functors realizing an equivalence are
covariant, rather than contravariant. When T1 and T2 are equivalent in either
sense, there is a way to “translate” (or perhaps better, “transform”) models of
T1 into models of T2, and vice versa. These transformations take objects of one
category—models of one theory—to objects of the other in a way that preserves
all of the structure of the arrows between objects, including, for instance, the
group structure of the automorphisms of each object, the inclusion relations of
“sub-objects”, and so on. These transformations are guaranteed to be inverses
to one another “up to isomorphism,” in the sense that if one begins with an
object of one category, maps using a functor realizing (half) an equivalence
or duality to the corresponding object of the other category, and then maps
back with the appropriate corresponding functor, the object one ends up with
is isomorphic to the object with which one began. In the case of the theory of
Einstein algebras and general relativity, there is also a precise sense in which
they preserve the empirical structure of the theories.
3 Smooth algebras and smooth manifolds
In what follows, by algebra we mean a commutative, associative algebra with
unit over R—i.e., a real vector space endowed with a commutative, associative
product and containing a multiplicative identity.17 By (algebra) homomorphism
we will mean a map that preserves the vector space operations, the product,
and the multiplicative identity; a bijective algebra homomorphism is an (algebra)
isomorphism.
3.1 Smooth algebras
Let A be an algebra. We denote by |A| the collection of homomorphisms from
A to R. The elements of |A| are known as the points of the algebra A; |A|
17Our treatment of smooth algebras follows Nestruev (2003). For more on Einstein algebras
in particular, see Geroch (1972) and Heller (1992).
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itself is the dual space of points.18 (Note, however, that we do not put any
algebraic structure on |A|.) An algebra A is geometric if there are no non-
zero elements f ∈ A that lie in the kernel of all of the elements of |A|, i.e., if⋂
p∈|A| ker(p) = {0}.
19
We also define the space A˜ as follows:
A˜ = {f˜ : |A| → R : ∃f ∈ A s.t. f˜(x) = x(f))}.
There is a natural algebraic structure on A˜, with operations given by:
(f˜ + αg˜)(x) = f˜(x) + αg˜(x) = x(f) + αx(g)
(f˜ · g˜)(x) = f˜(x) · g˜(x) = x(f) · g(f)
There is a canonical map τ : A → A˜ defined by f 7→ f˜ . In general, τ is a
surjective homomorphism. For geometric algebras, however, τ is also injective,
and thus an isomorphism. We will therefore freely identify a geometric algebra
A with A˜ through implicit appeal to τ .
Given a geometric algebra A, the weak topology on |A| is the coarsest topol-
ogy on |A| relative to which every element of A (or really, A˜) is continuous.
This defines a Hausdorff topology on A. Now suppose we have an algebra ho-
momorphism ψ : A→ B. Then ψ determines a map |ψ| : |B| → |A| defined by
|ψ| : x 7→ x ◦ ψ. Any map |ψ| that arises this way is continuous in the weak
topology; if ψ is an isomorphism, then |ψ| is a homeomorphism.
Now let A be a geometric algebra, and suppose that S ⊆ |A| is any subset
of its dual space of points. Then the restriction A|S of A to S is the set of
all functions f : S → R such that for any point x ∈ S, there exists an open
neighborhood O ⊆ |A| containing x, and an element f¯ ∈ A such that f and f¯
agree on all points in O. One easily verifies that A|S is an algebra, though it is
not in general a subalgebra of A.
Given any S ⊆ |A|, we can define a homomorphism ρS : A → A|S , defined
by f 7→ f|S, where here the restriction f|S is meant in the ordinary sense. The
map ρS is known as the restriction homomorphism. A special case of restriction
is restriction to |A|, i.e., to the dual space of the algebra, A||A|. This is the
18In some treatments of related material, including Rynasiewicz (1992), “points” are recon-
structed as maximal ideals of appropriate rings. We find the present approach more transpar-
ent, mostly because it emphasizes the sense in which points are “dual” to smooth functions
in the same sense of duality that one encounters elsewhere in geometry and algebra. But it
is closely related to the approach Rynasiewicz (1992) uses. In particular, if x is an element
of |A|, then ker(x) is an ideal, since if f ∈ ker(x), then for any g ∈ A, x(fg) = x(f)x(g) = 0;
moreover, it is maximal, since by linearity, x is surjective, and thus A/ ker(x) = R and it is
well known that for a commutative, unital ring (or algebra) A, an ideal I is maximal iff A/I
is a field. Conversely, as we note above, if A is geometric, then A is canonically isomorphic
to the space A˜, the maximal ideals of which consist in all functions vanishing at a given point
x ∈ |A|. So points in the sense that Ryansiewicz considers uniquely determine points in the
present sense, and vice versa.
19Note that the expression “geometric algebra” is also used (somewhat more often) to
described so-called Clifford algebras. See, for instance, Hestenes and Sobczyk (1984) or
Doran and Lasenby (2003). The present sense of the term is unrelated.
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collection of all maps on A that are “locally equivalent” to elements of A. We
will say that A is complete if it contains all maps of this form—i.e., if the
restriction homomorphism ρA : A→ A||A| is surjective.
A complete, geometric algebra A is called smooth if there exists a finite or
countable open covering {Uk} of the dual space |A| such that all the algebras
A|Uk are isomorphic to the algebra C
∞(Rn) of smooth functions on Rn, for some
fixed n. Here n is known as the dimension of the algebra. Note that this sense
of dimension is unrelated to the dimension of the vector space underlying A.
3.2 The duality of smooth algebras and manifolds
Smooth algebras and smooth manifolds bear a close relationship to one an-
other. Following Nestruev (2003), we present here one standard way to make
this relationship precise. We begin by defining two categories: the category
SmoothMan, whose objects are smooth manifolds and whose arrows are smooth
maps, and the category SmoothAlg, whose objects are smooth algebras and
whose arrows are algebra homomorphisms. We show that these two categories
are dual to one another. This result will be of crucial importance in our discus-
sion of Einstein algebras and relativistic spacetimes.
There is a way to “translate” from the framework of smooth manifolds into
the framework of smooth algebras. We call this translation F and define it as
follows.
• Given a smooth manifold M , F (M) = C∞(M) is the algebra of smooth
scalar functions on M .
• Given a smooth map ϕ :M → N , F (ϕ) is the map ϕˆ : C∞(N)→ C∞(M)
given by ϕˆ(f) = f ◦ ϕ for any f ∈ C∞(N).
Before showing that it is a contravariant functor between SmoothMan and
SmoothAlg, we pause to make a couple of remarks about F . Let M be a
manifold and consider the algebra F (M) = C∞(M) of smooth scalar functions
on M . There is a natural correspondence between points in M and elements of
|C∞(M)|, given by the following map:
θM :M → |C
∞(M)| θM (p)(f) = f(p) (3.1)
for any p ∈ M and f ∈ C∞(M). Note that θM (p) is indeed a homomorphism
C∞(M)→ R. One can easily verify that the algebra C∞(M) is geometric, so we
can consider the weak topology on |C∞(M)|. One then proves that relative to
the weak topology the map θM :M → |C
∞(M)| is a homeomorphism (Nestruev,
2003, 7.4).
This fact allows one to prove the following simple result. The map F trans-
lates a smooth manifold into a smooth algebra.
Proposition 3.1. If M is a smooth manifold, then F (M) = C∞(M) is a
smooth algebra (Nestruev, 2003, 7.5–7.6).
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The next important result about F captures a sense in which the smooth
maps between manifolds are characterized purely by their action on the algebras
of smooth scalar functions.
Proposition 3.2. Let M and N be smooth manifolds. A map ϕ : M → N is
smooth if and only if ϕˆ(C∞(N)) ⊂ C∞(M) (Nestruev, 2003, 7.16–7.18).
These results allow one to make precise a sense in which F is indeed a
“translation” from the framework of smooth manifolds into the framework of
smooth algebras. We have the following result.
Lemma 3.3. F : SmoothMan → SmoothAlg is a contravariant functor.
Proof. Proposition 3.1 immediately implies that F (M) is indeed an object in
SmoothAlg for every smooth manifold M . Let ϕ :M → N be a smooth map.
We need to show that the map F (ϕ) = ϕˆ : F (N)→ F (M) is an algebra homo-
morphism. Proposition 3.2 implies that ϕˆ(f) ∈ F (M) for every f ∈ F (N). One
can easily verify that ϕˆ preserves the vector space operations, the product, and
the multiplicative identity, so F (ϕ) = ϕˆ is an algebra homomorphism. Further-
more, it is easy to see that F preserves identities and reverses composition. This
implies that F : SmoothMan→ SmoothAlg is a contravariant functor.
There is also a way to “translate” from the framework of smooth algebras
into the framework of smooth manifolds. In order to describe this translation
we need to do some work. Let A be a smooth algebra. One can use the smooth
algebraic structure of A to define a smooth manifold G(A). The underlying
point set of the manifold G(A) is the set |A| of points of the algebra A.
Since A is a smooth algebra, there is a covering of |A| by open sets {Uk} along
with isomorphisms ik : A|Uk → C
∞(Rn) for some fixed n. We will use these
open sets and isomorphisms to define charts (U,ψ) on |A|. We first consider the
maps
hk : A→ C
∞(Rn) hk = ik ◦ ρUk ,
where ρUk : A → A|Uk is the restriction homomorphism. One can verify that
the maps |ρUk | : |A|Uk | → Uk ⊂ |A| are homeomorphisms onto Uk (Nestruev,
2003, 7.7-7.8). Since ik is an isomorphism and |C
∞(Rn)| = Rn (Nestruev, 2003,
3.16), it follows that |hk| = |ρUk | ◦ |ik| is a homeomorphism |hk| : R
n → Uk. We
therefore define the charts (Uk, ψk), where ψk = |hk|
−1 for each k ∈ N. One can
verify that these charts are compatible (Nestruev, 2003, 7.10).
In addition to these charts (Uk, ψk), we add charts of the form (V ∩Uk, ψk)
where V ⊂ |A| is an open set and k ∈ N. One can easily verify that these new
charts are compatible both with each other and with the original charts (Uk, ψk).
Since the topology on |A| is Hausdorff and since there is a countable cover of
charts of the form (Uk, ψk), if we throw in wholesale all of the charts on |A|
that are compatible with the charts of the form (Uk, ψk) and (V ∩Uk, ψk), then
we will have defined a smooth (Hausdorff, paracompact) manifold (Malament,
2012, Proposition 1.1.1). We call this smooth manifold G(A).
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The smooth manifold G(A) bears a close relationship to the original smooth
algebra A. Indeed, the elements of A correspond to smooth scalar functions on
G(A). This correspondence is given by the following map:
ηA : A→ FG(A) ηA : f 7−→ (p 7→ p(f)) (3.2)
for every f ∈ A and p ∈ G(A) = |A|. One can prove that for every f ∈ A
the function p 7→ p(f) is a smooth scalar function on G(A), and furthermore,
that the map ηA is a bijection (Nestruev, 2003, 7.11). We can therefore think
of elements of A as smooth scalar functions on the manifold G(A).
The translationG from the framework of smooth algebras into the framework
of smooth manifolds is defined as follows.
• Given a smooth algebra A, G(A) is the smooth manifold defined above.
• Given an algebra homomorphism ψ : A→ B, G(ψ) is the map |ψ| : |B| →
|A| between the manifolds G(B) and G(A).
Note that the definition of G(ψ) makes sense since G(B) and G(A) have under-
lying point sets |A| and |B|, respectively. Like Lemma 3.3, the following result
captures a sense in which G is a translation between these two frameworks.
Lemma 3.4. G : SmoothAlg→ SmoothMan is a contravariant functor.
Proof. We have already shown that G(A) is a smooth manifold for every smooth
algebra A. Let ψ : A → B be an algebra homomorphism. We need to show
that G(ψ) = |ψ| : |B| → |A| is a smooth map between the manifolds G(B) and
G(A). We begin by showing that
|̂ψ| ◦ ηA = ηB ◦ ψ (3.3)
For every f ∈ A and p ∈ |B| we see that following equations hold:
(|̂ψ| ◦ ηA(f))(p) = (ηA(f) ◦ |ψ|)(p)
= ηA(f)(p ◦ ψ)
= (p ◦ ψ)(f)
= (ηB ◦ ψ(f))(p)
The first equality follows from the definition of |̂ψ|, the second from the definition
of |ψ|, the third from the definition of ηA, and the fourth from the definition of
ηB. This establishes equation (3.3). Since the maps ηA and ηB are bijections,
(3.3) implies that |̂ψ| = ηB ◦ ψ ◦ η
−1
A . And this means that |̂ψ|(FG(A)) ⊂
FG(B). Proposition 3.2 then guarantees that |ψ| : G(B) → G(A) is a smooth
map. One easily verifies that G preserves identities and reverses composition,
so G : SmoothAlg→ SmoothMan is a contravariant functor.
We have shown that the maps F : SmoothMan → SmoothAlg and G :
SmoothAlg → SmoothMan are contravariant functors. We now show that
they are “up to isomorphism” inverses of one another. The following theorem
makes this idea precise.
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Theorem 3.5. The categories SmoothMan and SmoothAlg are dual.
Proof. We show that the families of maps η : 1SmoothAlg ⇒ F ◦ G and θ :
1SmoothMan ⇒ G ◦ F defined in equations (3.1) and (3.2) are natural iso-
morphisms. Since F and G are contravariant functors, this will imply that
SmoothMan and SmoothAlg are dual categories.
We first consider η. We need to verify that for every smooth algebra A
the component ηA : A → FG(A) is an algebra isomorphism. We have already
seen that ηA is bijective. One easily checks that ηA preserves the vector space
operations, the product, and the multiplicative identity. Equation (3.3) implies
that naturality square for η commutes, so η : 1SmoothAlg ⇒ F ◦G is a natural
isomorphism.
We now consider θ. We need to verify that for every smooth manifold M
the component θM :M → GF (M) is a diffeomorphism. We already know that
it is bijective. We show that θˆM (FGF (M)) ⊂ F (M) and then use Proposition
3.2 to conclude that θM is smooth. Let f ∈ FGF (M). Since ηF (M) : F (M) →
FGF (M) is a bijection there is some g ∈ F (M) such that ηF (M)(g) = f . We
then see that the following equalities hold for every p ∈M :
θˆM (f)(p) = θˆM (ηF (M)(g))(p) = (ηF (M)(g) ◦ θM )(p) = θM (p)(g) = g(p)
The first equality holds by our choice of the function g ∈ F (M), the second by
the definition of θˆM , the third by the definition of ηF (M), and the fourth by
the definition of θM . This implies that θˆM (f) = g ∈ F (M). So we have shown
that θˆM (FGF (M)) ⊂ F (M), which by Proposition 3.2 means that θM : M →
GF (M) is a smooth map. One argues in an analogous manner to show that θ−1M
is smooth. Therefore θM :M → GF (M) is a diffeomorphism.
We also need to show that the naturality square for θ commutes. Let ϕ :
M → N be a smooth map. We show that GF (ϕ) ◦ θM = θN ◦ ϕ. For every
p ∈M and f ∈ F (N) we see that the following equalities hold:
(|ϕˆ| ◦ θM (p))(f) = (θM (p) ◦ ϕˆ)(f)
= θM (p)(f ◦ ϕ)
= f ◦ ϕ(p)
= (θN ◦ ϕ(p))(f)
The first equality follows from the definition of |ϕˆ|, the second from the definition
of ϕˆ, the third from the definition of θM , and the fourth from the definition of
θN . Since p and f were arbitrary, this implies that GF (ϕ) ◦ θM = θN ◦ϕ, so θ :
1SmoothMan ⇒ G◦F is a natural isomorphism, and the categories SmoothMan
and SmoothAlg are dual.
Theorem 3.5 allows one to identify the smooth algebra A with FG(A) =
C∞(|A|) and the smooth manifold M with GF (M) = |C∞(M)|. In addition,
one can identify an algebra homomorphism ψ : A→ B between smooth algebras
with FG(ψ) = |̂ψ| and a smooth map ϕ : M → N between smooth manifolds
with GF (ϕ) = |ϕˆ|. We will implicitly appeal to these identifications in what
follows.
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4 Einstein algebras and relativistic spacetimes
The theory of Einstein algebras proceeds by taking a 4-dimensional smooth
algebra A—which by Theorem 3.5 corresponds to some smooth 4-dimensional
manifold—and defining additional structure on it. This structure corresponds
to the various fields that one requires to formulate general relativity. We begin
by describing this structure.
Let A be a smooth algebra. A derivation on A is an R-linear map Xˆ : A→ A
that satisfies the Leibniz rule, in the sense that
Xˆ(fg) = fXˆ(g) + gXˆ(f)
for all f, g ∈ A. The space of all derivations on A is a module over A. We
will use the notation Γˆ(A) to denote this module and Γˆ∗(A) to denote the dual
module. The elements of the dual module Γˆ∗(A) are just the A-linear maps
Γˆ∗(A)→ A. Derivations on A allow one to define an analog to “tangent spaces”
on smooth algebras. Given a derivation Xˆ on A and a point p ∈ |A|, one can
consider the linear map Xˆp : A→ R defined by Xˆp(f) = Xˆ(f)(p). The tangent
space to A at a point p ∈ |A| is the vector space TpA whose elements are maps
Xˆp : A→ R. The cotangent space to A at a point p ∈ |A| is defined similarly.
Derivations Xˆ on the smooth algebra A naturally correspond to ordinary
smooth vector fields X on the manifold G(A) = |A|. The correspondence is
given by
Xˆ(f)(p) = Xp(f) (4.1)
where f ∈ C∞(|A|) = A and p ∈ |A|. This correspondence plays a crucial
role in the following results, so we take a moment here to unravel the idea
behind it. Given a derivation Xˆ on A, equation (4.1) defines a vector field X
on the manifold G(A). This vector field X assigns the vector Xp to the point
p ∈ G(A), where the vector Xp is defined by its action f 7→ Xˆ(f)(p) on smooth
scalar functions f ∈ A on the manifold G(A). One uses the fact that Xˆ satisfies
the Leibniz rule to show that Xp is indeed a vector at the point p ∈ |A|. One
also verifies that the vector field X is smooth.
Conversely, given a vector field X on the manifold G(A), equation (4.1)
defines the derivation Xˆ on A. The derivation Xˆ maps an element f ∈ A to
the element of A defined by the scalar function X(f) on the manifold G(A). It
follows immediately that Xˆ is linear and satisfies the Leibniz rule. One can argue
in a perfectly analogous manner to show that elements of Γˆ∗(A) correspond to
smooth covariant vector fields on the manifold G(A). Note also that given
a point p ∈ |A| the correspondence (4.1) allows one to naturally identify the
elements Xˆp of the tangent space TpA and the vectors Xp at the point p in the
manifold G(A).
A metric on a smooth algebra A is a module isomorphism gˆ : Γˆ(A)→ Γˆ∗(A)
that is symmetric, in the sense that gˆ(Xˆ)(Yˆ ) = gˆ(Yˆ )(Xˆ) for all derivations Xˆ
and Yˆ on A. A metric gˆ on A induces a map Γˆ(A)× Γˆ(A)→ A defined by
Xˆ, Yˆ 7−→ gˆ(Xˆ)(Yˆ )
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Given a point p ∈ |A|, a metric on A also induces a map TpA×TpA→ R defined
by Xˆp, Yˆp 7→ gˆ(Xˆ, Yˆ )(p). We will occasionally abuse notation and use gˆ to refer
to all three of these maps, but it will always be clear from context which map
is intended.
If gˆ is a metric on an n-dimensional smooth algebra A and p is a point in |A|,
then there exists an m with 0 ≤ m ≤ n and a basis ξ1, . . . , ξn for the tangent
space TpA such that
gˆ(ξi, ξi) = +1 if 1 ≤ i ≤ m
gˆ(ξj , ξj) = −1 if m < j ≤ n
gˆ(ξi, ξj) = 0 if i 6= j
We call the pair (m,n−m) the signature of gˆ at the point p ∈ |A|. A metric gˆ
on |A| that has signature (1, n− 1) at every point p ∈ |A| is called a metric of
Lorentz signature.
We now have the resources necessary to begin discussing the theory of Ein-
stein algebras. An Einstein algebra is a pair (A, gˆ), where A is a smooth algebra
and gˆ is a metric on A of Lorentz signature. Before proving that the category
of Einstein algebras is dual to the category of relativistic spacetimes, we need
some basic facts about the relationship between metrics on algebras and metrics
on manifolds.
Lemma 4.1. Let M be an n-dimensional smooth manifold and let A be an
n-dimensional smooth algebra. Then the following all hold:
(1) If g is a Lorentzian metric on M , then gˆ is a Lorentzian metric on the
algebra F (M) = C∞(M), where gˆ(Xˆ)(Yˆ ) := g(X,Y );
(2) If gˆ is a Lorentzian metric on A, then |gˆ| is a Lorentzian metric on the
manifold G(A) = |A|, where |gˆ|(X,Y ) := gˆ(Xˆ)(Yˆ );
(3) If g is a metric on a M , then |gˆ| = g;
(4) If gˆ is a metric on A, then |̂gˆ| = gˆ.
Proof. Let g be a Lorentzian metric on M . One can easily verify that the
map gˆ : Γˆ(F (M)) → Γˆ∗(F (M)) defined by gˆ(Xˆ)(Yˆ ) = g(X,Y ) is a symmetric
module isomorphism, and therefore a metric on the smooth algebra F (M) =
C∞(M). It immediately follows from the bilinearity of g that gˆ is a module
homomorphism; that gˆ is bijective and symmetric follows from the fact that g
is non-degenerate and symmetric.
We also need to show that gˆ has Lorentz signature. Let p ∈ M and let
ξ1, . . . , ξn be an orthonormal basis (relative to the metric g) for the tangent space
TpM . Vectors at p ∈ M can be naturally identified via (4.1) with elements of
the tangent space TpF (M) to the algebra F (M) = C
∞(M). This identification
and the definition of gˆ immediately imply that gˆ must have the same signature
as g. So gˆ is a metric of Lorentz signature on F (M) and therefore (1) holds.
One argues in an analogous manner to demonstrate (2).
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If g is a metric on M and X and Y are vector fields on M , then |gˆ|(X,Y ) =
gˆ(Xˆ)(Yˆ ) = g(X,Y ). Furthermore, if gˆ is a metric on A and Xˆ and Yˆ are
derivations on A, then |̂gˆ|(Xˆ)(Yˆ ) = |gˆ|(X,Y ) = gˆ(Xˆ)(Yˆ ). This immediately
implies (3) and (4).
Lemma 4.1 captures a sense in which metrics on manifolds and metrics on
smooth algebras encode exactly the same information. Each kind of structure
naturally induces the other. This lemma strongly suggests, therefore, that we
will be able to recover a sense in which general relativity and the theory of
Einstein algebras are equivalent theories. Recovering this sense will require us
to define a category of models for the theory of Einstein algebras. In order to
do this, we need to discuss the “structure-preserving maps” between Einstein
algebras.
Let A and B be smooth algebras with ψ : A→ B an algebra homomorphism.
Let q be a point in |B| and let Xˆq ∈ TqB be an element of the tangent space
to B at q. The pullback of Xˆq along the homomorphism ψ is the element
ψ∗(Xˆq) of T|ψ|(q)A defined by its action ψ
∗(Xˆq)(f) = Xˆq(ψ(f)) on arbitrary
elements f ∈ A. One again uses the correspondence (4.1) between vectors at
the point |ψ|(q) in the manifold G(A) and elements of T|ψ|(q)A to verify that
indeed ψ∗(Xˆq) ∈ T|ψ|(q)A. The pullback also allows us to use a homomorphism
between smooth algebras to transfer other structures between the algebras. In
particular, if gˆ is a metric on A, the pushforward ψ∗(gˆ) of gˆ to B is the map
gˆ : Γˆ(B) × Γˆ(B)→ B defined by
ψ∗(gˆ)(Xˆ, Yˆ )(p) = gˆ(ψ
∗(Xˆp), ψ
∗(Yˆp))
for derivations Xˆ and Yˆ on B. We now have the machinery to define the
structure-preserving maps between Einstein algebras. If (A, gˆ) and (B, gˆ′) are
Einstein algebras, an algebra homomorphism ψ : A→ B is an Einstein algebra
homomorphism if it satisfies ψ∗(gˆ) = gˆ
′. Einstein algebra homomorphisms are
required to preserve both algebraic structure and the metric structure on the
algebras.
We can now define the category of models EA for the theory of Einstein
algebras. The objects of the category EA are Einstein algebras (A, gˆ), and the
arrows are Einstein algebra homomorphisms. Our aim is to prove that EA
and GR are dual categories. We first isolate two facts about the relationship
between algebra homomorphisms and smooth maps in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let ϕ : M → N be a smooth map between manifolds M and N ,
and ψ : A → B be an algebra homomorphism between smooth algebras A and
B. Then the following both hold:
(1) ϕ̂∗(Xp) = ϕˆ
∗(Xˆp) for every vector Xp at the point p ∈M ;
(2) ψ∗(Xˆq) = ̂|ψ|∗(Xq) for every Xˆq ∈ TqB.
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Proof. Let Xp be a vector at p in the manifold M and f ∈ C
∞(N) = F (N).
We demonstrate that (1) holds simply by computing the following.
ϕ̂∗(Xp)(f) = ϕ∗(Xp)(f) = Xp(f ◦ ϕ) = Xp(ϕˆ(f)) = Xˆp(ϕˆ(f)) = ϕˆ
∗(Xˆp)(f)
The first and fourth equalities follow from the correspondence (4.1), the second
equality from the standard geometric definition of the pushforward ϕ∗, the third
from the definition of the map ϕˆ, and the fifth from the algebraic definition of
the pullback ϕˆ∗.
The argument for (2) is perfectly analogous. Let q ∈ |B| be a point with
Xˆq ∈ TqB and f ∈ A. We compute the following.
ψ∗(Xˆq)(f) = Xˆq(ψ(f)) = Xq(ψ(f)) = Xq(f ◦ |ψ|) = |ψ|∗(Xq)(f) = ̂|ψ|∗(Xq)(f)
The first equality follows from the algebraic definition of the pullback ψ∗, the
second and fifth follow from the correspondence (4.1), the third by the definition
of |ψ|, and the fourth by the standard geometric definition of the pushforward
|ψ|∗.
In conjunction with Theorem 3.5, Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 allow us to define a
pair of translations between the framework of Einstein algebras and the standard
framework of general relativity. We first consider the natural way to translate
relativistic spacetimes into Einstein algebras. We call this translation J and
define it as follows.
• Given a relativistic spacetime (M, g), J(M, g) = (C∞(M), gˆ) is the Ein-
stein algebra with underlying smooth algebraC∞(M) and metric gˆ defined
in Lemma 4.1.
• Given an isometry ϕ : (M, g)→ (M ′, g′), J(ϕ) is the map ϕˆ : C∞(M ′)→
C∞(M).
The translation J is perfectly analogous to the contravariant functor F described
above. Indeed, as with F we have the following simple result about J .
Lemma 4.3. J : GR→ EA is a contravariant functor.
Proof. If (M, g) is an object in GR, then it immediately follows that J(M, g)
is an object in EA. Proposition 3.1 implies that C∞(M) is a smooth algebra
and Lemma 4.1 implies that gˆ is a metric of Lorentz signature on C∞(M), so
J(M, g) is an Einstein algebra.
Now let ϕ : (M, g) → (M ′, g′) be an isometry. We need to show that
J(ϕ) = ϕˆ : C∞(M ′) → C∞(M) is an Einstein algebra homomorphism. Since
ϕ is a smooth map, Lemma 3.3 guarantees that ϕˆ : C∞(M ′) → C∞(M) is an
algebra homomorphism. It remains to show that ϕˆ∗(gˆ
′) = gˆ. Let Xˆ and Yˆ be
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derivations on C∞(M). We compute that
ϕˆ∗(gˆ
′)(Xˆp, Yˆp) = gˆ
′(ϕˆ∗(Xˆp), ϕˆ
∗(Yˆp))
= gˆ′(ϕ̂∗(Xp), ϕ̂∗(Yp))
= g′(ϕ∗(Xp), ϕ∗(Yp))
= ϕ∗(g′)(Xp, Yp) = g(Xp, Yp) = gˆ(Xˆp, Yˆp)
for every point p ∈M = |C∞(M)|. The first equality follows from the definition
of ϕˆ∗, the second from Lemma 4.2, the third from the definition of gˆ
′, the fourth
from the definition of ϕ∗, the fifth since ϕ is an isometry, and the sixth from
the definition of gˆ. This implies that ϕˆ∗(gˆ
′) = gˆ and therefore that J(ϕ) = ϕˆ
is an arrow J(M ′, g′)→ J(M, g). One easily verifies that J preserves identities
and reverses composition.
There is also a way to translate from the framework of general relativity into
the framework of Einstein algebras. We call this translation K and define it as
follows.
• Given an Einstein algebra (A, gˆ), K(A, gˆ) = (|A|, |gˆ|) is the relativistic
spacetime with underlying manifold |A| = G(A) and metric |gˆ| defined in
Lemma 4.1.
• Given an Einstein algebra homomorphism ψ : (A, gˆ) → (A′, gˆ′), K(ψ) is
the map |ψ| : |A′| → |A|.
The translation K is perfectly analogous to the contravariant functor G de-
scribed above. And again, we have the following result.
Lemma 4.4. K : EA→ GR is a contravariant functor.
Proof. If (A, gˆ) is an object in EA, then it immediately follows that K(A, gˆ) is
an object in GR. Indeed, we have already seen that G(A) = |A| is a smooth
manifold, and Lemma 4.1 implies that |gˆ| is a metric on |A|, so (|A|, |gˆ|) is a
relativistic spacetime.
Now let ψ : (A, gˆ)→ (A′, gˆ′) be an Einstein algebra homomorphism. Lemma
3.4 guarantees thatK(ϕ) = |ψ| : |A′| → |A| is a smooth map. It remains to show
that |ψ|∗(|gˆ|) = |gˆ′|. By Lemma 4.1, it will suffice to show that |ψ|∗(g) = g′.
We let X and Y be vector fields on |A′| and compute that
|ψ|∗(g)(Xp, Yp) = g(|ψ|∗(Xp), |ψ|∗(Yp))
= gˆ( ̂|ψ|∗(Xp), ̂|ψ|∗(Yp))
= gˆ(ψ∗(Xˆp), ψ
∗(Yˆp))
= ψ∗(gˆ)(Xˆp, Yˆp) = gˆ
′(Xˆp, Yˆp) = g
′(Xp, Yp)
for every point p ∈ |A′|. The first equality follows from the definition of |ψ|∗,
the second from the definition of gˆ, the third from Lemma 4.2, the fourth from
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the definition of ψ∗, the fifth since ψ is an Einstein algebra homomorphism,
and the sixth from the definition of gˆ′. This implies that |ψ| is an isometry
and therefore an arrow K(A′, gˆ′) → K(A, gˆ). One again easily verifies that K
preserves identities and reverses composition.
We now have the resources necessary to prove our main result. The con-
travariant functors J and K realize a duality between the category of models
for the theory of Einstein algebras and the category of models for general rela-
tivity. This result essentially follows as a corollary to Theorem 3.5 along with
parts (3) and (4) of Lemma 4.1.
Theorem 4.5. The categories EA and GR are dual.
Proof. The proof exactly mirrors the proof of Theorem 3.5. We again show
that the families of maps η : 1EA ⇒ J ◦ K and θ : 1GR ⇒ K ◦ J defined in
equations (3.1) and (3.2) are natural isomorphisms. It follows from Theorem
3.5 that the naturality squares for η and θ commute, so we need only check that
the components of η and θ are isomorphisms.
Let (A, gˆ) be an object in EA and consider the component η(A,gˆ) : A →
C∞(|A|). We have already seen in Theorem 3.5 that η(A,gˆ) is an algebra iso-
morphism. In addition, part (4) of Lemma 4.1 implies that η(A,gˆ) preserves the
metric and therefore is an isomorphism between Einstein algebras. A perfectly
analogous argument demonstrates that the components θ(M,g) are isomorphisms
between relativistic spacetimes.
Geroch (1972) goes on to define other structures, analogous to, for instance,
tensor fields and covariant derivative operators, in purely algebraic terms, us-
ing strategies similar to those used here to define derivations and metrics. With
this machinery, he argues, one can express any equation one likes, including Ein-
stein’s equation and various matter field equations, in algebraic terms. In this
way, one may proceed to do relativity theory using Einstein algebras and struc-
tures defined on them, in much the same way that one would using Lorentzian
manifolds. The functors J and K, meanwhile, along with the results proved and
methods developed here, provide a way of translating between equations relating
tensor fields on a Lorentzian manifold (M, g) and the corresponding structures
defined on the Einstein algebra J(M, g). Moreover, we have a strong sense in
which J andK preserve any possible empirical structure associated with general
relativity, on either formulation, since any of the empirical content of general
relativity on Lorentzian manifolds will be expressed using invariant geometrical
structures such as curves, tensor fields, etc. or their algebraic analogues, and it
is precisely this sort of structure that J and K preserve.
5 Conclusion
Theorem 4.5 establishes a sense in which the Einstein algebra formalism is
equivalent to the standard formalism for general relativity. This sense of equiv-
alence captures the idea that, on a natural standard of comparison, the two
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theories have precisely the same mathematical structure—and thus, we claim,
the same capacities to represent physical situations. Indeed, our proof of The-
orem 4.5 makes precise how any given model of one of the formulations may
be transformed into a model of the other. This transformation is “loss-less” in
the sense that one can then recover the original model of the first formulation
up to isomorphism. In particular, we do not find a compelling sense in which
one of the formulations exhibits “excess structure” that the other eliminates.
Insofar as one wants to associate these two formalisms with “substantivalist”
and “relationist”—or at least, non-substantivalist—approaches to spacetime, it
seems that we have a kind of equivalence between different metaphysical views
about spatiotemporal structure.
Of course, it remains open to the person who wants to give these formalisms
a metaphysical significance to say that one of them is more fundamental than
the other. In a sense, this was Earman’s original proposal: an Einstein algebra,
he believed, would give an intrinsic characterization of what a family of isometric
spacetimes had in common, and in this sense, was more fundamental than any
particular representation of the algebra. Theorem 4.5, then, captures a sense in
which the converse is equally true: a given relativistic spacetime may be thought
of as offering an intrinsic characterization of what a family of isometric Einstein
algebras have in common. For our part, we see no no reason to choose between
these approaches, at least in the absence of new physics that shows how one
bears a closer relationship to future theories.20 Both encode precisely the same
physical facts about the world, in somewhat different languages. It seems far
more philosophically interesting to recognize that the world may admit of such
different, but equally good, descriptions than to argue about which approach is
primary.
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